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Accountability, the APRM State and Traditional Polity:  
The Case of Ethiopia 
 
Minga Negash 
 
 
“The asymmetry of power between the ruler and the ruled, which generates a 
heightened sense of identity contrast, can be combined with cultural prejudice in 
explaining away failures of governance and public policy.”   
               
     (Amartya Sen, 2006: 105-106) 
 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to use agency theory to understand issues of governance and 
accountability in the public sector. It contributes to the debate about “good” 
governance in Ethiopia and by extension to the rest of Africa. The contributions are 
fourfold. First, using the microeconomic theory of agency and Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, the paper documents that accountability and democracy are not alien 
concepts to Africans. Second, the discussion on the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) and agency led to one important insight. The existence of a 
mono ethnic or uni-cultured state is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
the creation of a government that is accountable.  Third, the paper notes that Africa’s 
traditional (indigenous) leadership can have synergetic value when the governance 
system is structured under the trias politica doctrine. Furthermore, advancing the 
trias politica doctrine in the context of multidimensional identities can serve as a 
prelude to a regional and a pan African constitution. Fourth, with regard to Ethiopia, 
the APRM brings both opportunities and challenges for the ruling regime as well as 
for its competitors.  
 
Introduction 
At the heart of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) instrument one finds 
the crucial concept of (government) accountability. An emerging approach to the 
study of accountability is the microeconomic theory of agency. Using a 
microeconomic framework to understand political governance and institutions of 
control is a relatively new research avenue that is becoming popular. This paper uses 
the ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) concept and links the problems 
of political governance to one key social theory; Hofstede’s (1980) study of cultural 
dimensions. This link enables us to analyze whether effective neo-liberal institutions 
of “good” governance can be realized in predominantly traditionalist, non-
individualistic, masculine dominated and power distanced cultures of Africa.    
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The APRM is a country specific performance scorecard that shows whether progress 
has been achieved in meeting some of the goals of the African Union (AU) and the 
New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The scorecard has 
four substantive areas. They are democracy and political governance, economic 
governance and management, corporate governance and socio economic 
development. Many commentators and polemic writers have described the APRM as 
a neo-liberal (Western) instrument of “good” governance.1  
 
The English thesaurus defines the term traditional as customary, conventional, 
usual, established, fixed, long-established, time-honoured, habitual, accepted, and its 
antonym is innovate2. Similarly, the term indigenous is defined as native, original, 
aboriginal, home grown, local and its antonym is foreign. A great deal and variety of 
literature exists about leadership. It shows that leadership is embedded in the 
cultural philosophy of the institution (law, organization, society) that is being led, 
and is distinct from management. In this respect Sen (2006:112) observes that 
behaviour and thinking are influenced by cultural background. The nexus of 
contracts (agency) theory however attempts to model economic behavior and 
follows a rationalist-utilitarian-individualist paradigm.3 In contrast, research on 
culture and leadership is predominantly qualitative, phenomenological and 
interpretive. It focuses on institutions, social systems, values, norms, identities, laws, 
organizations, power relations, trade and migrations, intermarriages, “social psyche” 
and globalization. In trying to understand the concept of accountability in the 
context of the emergent APRM state and traditional (indigenous) polity, it is 
important to note the role of culture and the tensions between paradigms.   
 
The literature review on accountability in the context of NEPAD and APRM can be 
found elsewhere. For completeness sake, key terms and concepts are reproduced 
here again. “The terms ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ are used 
interchangeably, but for Olson, Humphrey and Guthrie (2001:507) ‘accounts are the 
control feature of life and accountability is the process of giving accounts’. Willmott 
(1996) cited in Olson et al (op cit) relates the concept of accountability to the 
                                                          
1  See the APRM questionnaire at www.nepad.org. The peer review team so far consisted of 
three eminent persons whose term of office has just expired. The term of office of the 
Secretary General of NEPAD will also expire shortly. In January 2007, at the Heads of States 
and Governments meeting in Addis Ababa, Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia has been 
assigned to lead NEPAD and the APRM process.  Hence, the inter-governmental institution 
that was created to advance “good” governance is facing many challenges.   
2  Note that according to the thesaurus there is a negative association between innovation and 
tradition. 
3  For a critique and summary of the rationality theory see the motivations for the widespread use 
of “bounded rationality” settings in economic research and Amartya Sen’s series of works on 
the “problems of the rational fool.”  
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universality of human action, irrespective of whether one is working in the context 
of modern institutions or in so-called primitive societies.” Negash (2005:2).  
Furthermore, Sinclair (1995) outlines five types of accountability. They are political 
accountability, public accountability, managerial accountability, professional 
accountability and personal accountability.    
 
This paper focuses on APRM and Africa’s traditional polity (leadership 
institutions); hence it deals with political and public accountability. Taking 
cognizance of the contributions of social researchers, the paper analyzes the forms 
of political and public accountability from an agency perspective, and observes two 
areas of conflict in neo-liberal institutional (constitutional) arrangements. Although 
in the context of the governance of economic institutions, conflict arising from the 
problems of delegation and stewardship was identified by Adam Smith as far back 
as 1776. Conflict analysis based on demographic classification of population groups 
is not new. It is observed in classical Marxian studies, in Weber’s “tensions and 
contradictions” between “state and society”, and in ethnographers’ “fault lines” or 
other culture and gender based politics. Hence, the philosophy behind classification 
needs to be carefully understood. In this respect Bauman (1991:1) states the 
following: 
 
“To classify means to set apart, to segregate. It means first to postulate that the 
world consists of discrete entities, then to postulate that each entity has a group of 
similar or adjacent entities with which it belongs, and with which together, it is 
opposed to some entities …to classify is to find the world a structure”.  
  
Smith’s observation is about the relationship between the agent and the principals, 
irrespective of the demographic or another form of classification. Assuming the 
principals’ basic rights are enshrined in a formal constitution,4 and the rights 
enshrined in the constitution are enforceable, the agency problems of delegation (for 
the principals) cannot be eliminated without the incurrence of substantial costs of 
monitoring. Evidently, these monitoring costs will have to be borne by the 
principals.   
 
Smith’s observation can be extended into political competition. The second form of 
conflict is between the individuals and groups that are competing to obtain agency 
from the principals. That is, individuals and groups (including modern political 
parties) compete and seek legitimacy for controlling the levers of State power, and 
hence resources. Here, unless the competition among agents (leaders and political 
parties) is regulated and carefully monitored, the contest can be destructive. The 
election crisis and disputes in DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe, etc are 
                                                          
4  In circumstances where the rights of the principals are not observed, the agency problems of 
delegation and trust become complex.   
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examples. In this case too, the principals are obliged to incur the costs of creating 
and administering the instruments (law, organization) of control. Therefore, the 
agency approach to the study of accountability, despite its reductionism, sheds a new 
light to the problems of “good” governance. It is an antecedent to the deconstruction 
of singular delusions about culture, identity and nationalism (state as well as ethnic). 
Finally, agency theory shows that a neo-liberal system of “good” government 
structure must be founded in the trias politica (separation of powers) doctrine. 
 
Notwithstanding the contributions of agency theory, attempting to address eclectic 
studies like political-public governance without consideration of ontological factors 
in a given country makes the research incomplete. Ontological reality can be studied 
either by accepting widely held views and norms, or through experience or both. 
Hofstede’s (1980) study of cultural dimensions is better positioned to indicate 
common trajectories in cultures. It will be used to analyze the problem of “good” 
governance in countries where the dominant culture is collectivist. The scope of this 
study excludes research avenues that aim at capturing the so called “the African 
psyche” or an “ethnic psyche”.   
 
Ethiopia will be used as a case study. There are many reasons for this. First, it is a 
multicultural State with a recorded history of indigenous (traditional) leadership and 
polity at least until the slow motion military coup of 1975.  Second, Ethiopia was a 
(founding) member of several multilateral institutions:- including the League of 
Nations, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), AU and 
NEPAD. Membership suggests ratification and compliance to the key provisions of 
the convention. More importantly, in spite of its limiting constitution and political 
structures, Ethiopia has agreed to be a member of the APRM process. Hence, despite 
institutional and ideological limitations, Ethiopia purports to be an APRM compliant 
State. Third, despite two radically different constitutions and political doctrines 
during the last 25 years, traditional values of the Atse State (more on this in Section 
III) persist. Therefore, Ethiopia is a useful study subject in that despite two radically 
different forms of governance ideologies, the problems of accountability remain 
unchanged.5  
 
The paper uses a mix of qualitative and case methodology to show that neo liberal 
system of “good” governance, as advanced in the AU and NEPAD documents are 
unlikely to be realized in Ethiopia in the short term, and by extension in many parts 
of Africa. The reason for this rather pessimist conclusion is simple. It is important to 
note that “good” governance is not an event. It is rather an outcome of a well 
                                                          
5  For more information on this matter, see the constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia at 
www.walta.com and press clippings such as Feb 23 2007 edition of the Economist. 
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designed process. Sound institutions (traditional and modern) of accountability are 
the sina qua non of “good” governance.  
 
Hence, unlike the mainstream literature on organizational control, the concept of 
accountability needs to be redefined in the context of public governance, and 
articulated in the context of non-individualist, power distanced and masculine 
dominated cultures of Africa. How Africans recognize and manage risk (uncertainty 
avoidance) needs to be systematically studied. African decision making systems, if 
there is any, need to be identified. If these theoretical and practical voids are not 
filled, neo-liberal paradigm, a paradigm that is built on a Western cultural milieu, 
will remain irrelevant to Africa as was classical Marxism. Furthermore, African 
culture and traditional (indigenous) leadership institutions will continue to be 
undermined. They will continue to be perceived to be incompatible with governance 
innovations and the production of new knowledge.      
 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section II provides a 
theoretical background to the problems of agency, reviews the literature on culture, 
and attempts to link African culture to the trias politica doctrine, and the problems of 
accountability. Section III examines the link between culture, leadership and 
accountability in the context of Ethiopia. It narrates the events leading to, and the 
experience of post imperial Ethiopia, and provides an outline of the gains (if any), 
lost opportunities and the new challenges. Section IV contains a discussion of the 
result of section III and links culture and traditional leadership with constitutionality. 
It compares and contrasts the South African and Ethiopian constitutions from the 
perspectives of traditional leadership. Section V contains summary, concluding 
remarks and indicates the avenues for future research.  
 
II Relevant Literature  
The academic literature on Africa’s traditional (indigenous) leadership and 
governance systems is fairly extensive. It is found in the knowledge domains of 
history, sociology, political science, philosophy, law and public administration. How 
traditional (indigenous) leadership institutions were used and misused during 
colonial times is documented. The essays by and large paint a negative picture of not 
only the institutions of traditional polity (as an agent of slave trade) but the entire 
continent. More recent studies on Africa focus on the failure of the post colony state 
itself (Bembe, 1991). Herbst’s (1996) “failed state”, and Muchie’s (2006) “diseased 
state”, have one common trajectory. Both look at the political economy of African 
States and attribute the continent’s under performance to weak leadership. 
 
Furthermore, studies that approach Africa’s development problems from the 
perspectives of “knowledge systems” often neglect the link between knowledge 
capital (intangible assets) and leadership (including creating an enabling 
 5
 
environment). Their focus has been on “catching up”, “capacity building” and 
adaptation of “appropriate technologies” that are invented elsewhere (Johnson and 
Lundval, 2003; Mytelka 2003; Jamison, 2003). This direction of research has a trade 
focus, and attempts to patent indigenous knowledge that has potential patentable 
value. Hence, the link between knowledge capital and leadership on one hand, and 
relationship between indigenous leadership and its externality in value formation on 
the other hand, have not been properly articulated in the African context. 
 
Notwithstanding this, Kuada (2003) observes the impact of social ties on innovation 
and learning. For this, he relies on social capital theory of sociology. This theory is 
concerned about the role that relationship plays between individuals and groups in 
organizations. Following Hofstede’s (op cit) thread, Kuada (2003:113) identifies 
how trust is built in a collectivist relationship, in Ghana and by extension in Africa, 
and classifies group relationship into:- (1) family based ties (2) ethnic based ties and 
(3) non-kin based ties (religious groups, clubs and societies, professional 
associations, etc.).6  Hence, the concept of accountability, as defined in self interest 
and rationalist premised control literature (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998; Kaplan 
and Atkinson, 1998) is insufficient to explain individual and group behavior without 
contextualizing specific cultural trajectory. Therefore, it is important to examine 
whether there is a possibility that African’s non-individualistic, power distanced and 
traditional beliefs may influence the way accountability and responsibility are 
interpreted in Africa.  In this respect (Negash 2005: 8) notes the following: 
 
“Recent studies in sociology distinguish between value systems of people who are 
living in different parts of the world. Hence, it is important to note that the 
mainstream control literature depicts particular value systems. However, in many 
parts of Africa, ‘tribal’ and religious leaders, for example, do not account in the 
ordinary sense of the word but share responsibility in times of conflict, tragedies 
and natural calamites. Ethics, integrity and value systems relate to the concept of 
accountability in several ways. Mainstream control literature does not seem to be 
adequately addressing these institutional differences.” 
 
Focusing on the agency problem, Figure 1 compares the nexus of contract 
relationship in business and political settings.7 The broken arrows indicate the flow 
of information or power. The rest of the figure is self-explanatory. The important 
thing to note from Figure 1 is that the principals have different powers in various 
forms of agency, and the agents face different forms and degrees of accountability 
                                                          
6  However, it is important to note that this method of trust building is not uniquely African. 
International trade networks and immigrant communities indicate some key aspects of Kuada’s 
thread. 
7  Note that the “nexus of contracts theory” is different from the “social contract” theory that is 
commonly found in the sociology literature. 
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(Figure 1 panel B). Furthermore, it is important to note how the agency problem gets 
blurred when agency (authority) is legitimized through birth right, kinship, 
ethnic/clan/religious/ position.  
 
Similarly, in classical Marxist governance structure, the relationship between the 
citizen, the ruling vanguard party and the State organs often gets blurred, bringing 
new and complex forms of agency. In contrast, the neo liberal governance structure 
is founded in the trias politica doctrine, and attempts to ensure accountability by 
creating various forms of control. It is important to note that the trias politica 
doctrine requires the separation of the powers of the law makers from the executive 
branch of government, ensures the independence and strength of the judiciary and 
the monitoring institutions (see Figure 1 panel B). At the other extreme, where the 
trias politica doctrine is not well articulated, the institutions (law, organizations) of 
accountability are either weak or non-existent or obscured in the governance 
structure.   
 
However, at this juncture one has to be careful in attributing “good” governance and 
democracy only to Western systems. If democracy is interpreted by elections and 
votes, which are important, despite the “primitive” nature of the procedures, one can 
see some aspects of Athenian democracy for example in Oromo and Dinka societies 
in the Horn of Africa. If democracy is defined more broadly viz. as consultative 
governance, important general assemblies (Imbizo) or being heard in these 
assemblies, then this is a common practice in most parts of Africa. Hence, traditional 
leaders did not operate without consultations, courts, councils, advisors, etc. 
Therefore, the debate about the presence or absence of democracy in Africa should 
not be limited to formal State structures. It should also incorporate the decision 
making systems. 
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Hofstede (1980) identifies four underlying societal values. These societal values are 
individualism (self concept of I or we), power distance (extent to which hierarchy 
and unequal power distribution in institutions and organizations is accepted), 
uncertainty avoidance (written and unwritten rules of behaviour, formal organization 
structure and procedures) and masculinity. More recently, Hofstede adds a fifth 
dimension of long term orientation, as opposed to short term orientation, to explain 
Eastern (Asian) culture of future orientation, perseverance and thrift. Figure 2 was 
extracted from the original work. 
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From Figure 2 we learn the interdependence between political structure, societal 
norms (value systems of major groups of population) and origins. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the direction of causality between political structure and 
societal norms is not necessarily uni-dimensional (see also Sen, 2006: chapter 6). 
There is also a possibility that even the empirical relations might be explained by 
chance correlations rather than causality. The earlier version of Hofstede’s survey of 
world cultures indicated that in countries where neo-liberal governance institutions 
are dominant (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Italy, Canada, 
the Netherlands) the dominant culture reflected relatively higher level of 
individualism, lower level of power distance, lower level of uncertainty avoidance 
(except France) and moderate level of masculinity.8 In contrast, Japan showed low 
level of individualism, high level of uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and 
moderate level of power distance. As noted earlier, the interesting issue for this 
paper is whether culture is relevant to the trias politica doctrine and the agency 
relationship that was depicted in Figure 1 Panel B. If culture is relevant to the 
agency relationship, one can argue by stating that the systems of accountability and 
the instruments of control in the two societies (example Western and African) 
cannot be the same as the two societies are culturally different. Therefore, a proper 
articulation of Africa’s cultures is a prerequisite to the study of accountability.  
 
                                                          
8  The urban rural cultural divide is not discussed here. 
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Fortunately, Geert Hoftede’s world survey of cultures has recently started to include 
Africa. Table 1 contains an extrapolation from Geert HofstedeTM cultural dimension 
indices. A column is added for author’s remarks about Ethiopia. The indices are 
available in graphical forms at http://www.geert-hofstede.com/. In the 2003 survey 
three African regions (West Africa, East Africa and South Africa) were included. 
The countries covered by the survey were Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa.    
 
Assuming the samples are representative, Table 1 allows us to make interesting 
comparisons. First, Christian dominated countries have lower level of power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance than Muslim dominated countries. Second, 
power distance is high in East Africa, West Africa and the Arab World. 
Individualistic culture index is low in West Africa, East Africa, the Arab World and 
Muslim world, but high in Christian dominated countries. Third the individualist 
culture index for South Africa is higher than world average, suggesting that ubuntu 
(African) culture might have been suppressed. The implications of these indicators 
to self interest and rationalist based research and governance paradigms are 
straightforward.  One central lesson that can be learned from Hofstede’s survey is 
that the study of leadership (traditional and modern) cannot be decoupled from 
culture.  That is, comparing world cultures using similar benchmarks enables us to 
find internationally acceptable common threads to the study of the concepts of 
accountability and responsibility. 
 10
 
 
III Culture, Leadership, Agency & the Modern State: The Case of Ethiopia 
The Horn of Africa has been unfairly described as the “Balkans of Africa”. This 
characterization can be easily challenged. First, similar ontological realities exist 
in many parts of the world. Mono ethnic and singular culture states are few. 
Second, within Africa itself, the Horn of Africa is not different from other parts 
of the continent. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Southern 
Africa serve as examples. Hence, in contrast to the Balkans description one can 
take a different view and characterize the Horn of Africa as ‘a melting pot’ or a 
place of interactions of African and Arab cultures on one hand, and Islam and 
Judo-Christian identities and value systems on the other hand. Traditional belief 
systems are also widespread. Added to these are the ethnic and other forms of 
identities. In other words, one can describe the Horn of Africa in a 
multidimensional identity and culture framework rather than in a framework of 
discrete and singular identities that needs some kind of aggregation. The 
multiple identity discourse has a theoretical plausibility to provide a base for the 
development of persuasive arguments for advancing the APRM.  
 
From an historical perspective, by most accounts, Ethiopia is an old nation-state, 
with various shapes and sizes, a recorded history and a civilization that goes 
back to thousands of years. Despite the loss of its coastal territories in 1991, it is 
an important regional power in the post 9/11 world order (disorder). Hence, the 
study of the Ethiopian State is not only complex and tantalizing, but it is also an 
eclectic discipline. Since the purpose of this paper is to examine APRM and 
traditional leadership, we focus on Ethiopia’s recent past. In this respect the 
impact of the Fascist occupation of Ethiopia during WW II on the type of 
political leadership that emerged in the country needs to be studied carefully.9 
The purpose of history is not limited to keeping records and understanding the 
past, but to assist us in comprehending the relationship between the past and the 
present.10 This paper only focuses on the history of traditional polity to the 
extent it is relevant to the formation of the APRM State. Hence, for the purpose 
                                                          
9  Readers interested in the Ethiopian history, politics, sociology, economy and philosophy 
are referred to the works of Lapiso Dilebo, Fikere Tolosa, Getatchew Haile, Tadesse 
Tamirat, Shumet Sishagn, Richard Pankhurst, Eshetu Chole, Befekadu Degefe, Desalegn 
Rahmeto, Donald Levine, Haggai Erlich, Negussay Ayele, Sven Rubenson, Claude 
Sumner, Marina Ottaway, Merid Wolde Aregai, Haile Larebo, Messay Kebede, Tewodros 
Kiros, Amsalu Aklilu, Christopher Clapam, Harold Marcus, Asmerom Legesse,  
Mohammed Hassen, Donald Donham, Wendy James  and Bahiru Zewdie.  For a recent 
review of previous works on contemporary Ethiopia, see Cedric Barnes (2003), 
“Sovereignty, identity and modernity-understanding Ethiopia”, African Affairs 2003, 102, 
507-514. 
10  Examining the power relations in the early years of post WW II period might in part 
explain the origins and behavior of certain culture based politics of contemporary 
Ethiopia. In this respect it is important to note that a disorientated ethno-history not only 
documents inaccuracy but spreads cultural bigotry.     
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of this paper the fact that Ethiopia had a traditional polity (a centralized tributary 
and quasi feudal system, with its evident domineering culture and economics) is 
important. The only interruption to this traditional polity in the recent past (20th 
century) was the five years occupation of Ethiopia during WW II. Hence, to 
examine the problems of accountability in contemporary Ethiopia, it is 
important to go a step back and understand the type of indigenous leadership 
Ethiopia had after WW II.    
 
In his seminal work on Haile Selassie I, “the anatomy of a traditional polity”, 
Markakis (1974) outlines the tensions in the post war Government of Ethiopia, 
and describes the Emperor as possessing “a brilliant administrative and political 
acumen”. Markakis (op cit) showed how the Emperor’s leadership team, which 
combined products of modern education and traditional leadership, was able to 
maintain effective control throughout Ethiopia.11 Nonetheless, despite 
achievements in education and development, Haile Selassie was an absolute 
monarch. In other words, the agency problem that was discussed in the previous 
sections was in its acute form. 
 
From a culture perspective, even though Haile Selassie comes from the Shoan 
nobility, he was neither exclusively an Amara nor his upbringing suggested a 
singular culture. Notwithstanding these, there is a widespread allegation that 
Emperor Haile Selassie I extended the Amara culture to other parts of the 
country. He promoted acculturation rather than a multidimensional identity. 
Holding aside the allegation, the Amara culture this author knows can be 
explained by the following key characteristics. They are collectivism, power 
distance, devotion, monogamy, shimage’le (conflict resolution and deal 
making), afer’sata and awchachign (naming and shaming of wrong doers at a 
public gathering), gu’elt (communal land holding system), subsistence farming, 
e’set-ageba and shengo (debate before verdict), perseverance, thrift, social roles 
(for women, children, elders) and appreciation of scholarship (writing system, 
memorization of religious dogma, interpretation of religious manuscripts:- 
priesthood/debtera-hood). Religion had its own dynamics.12 To suggest that the 
                                                          
11  More recently Markakis has been facing a series of criticisms. Notwithstanding these 
Markakis’s’ series of works on Ethiopia remain an important body of knowledge about 
Haile Selassie’s period.   
12  According to the New English Bible, Oxford University Press 1974,  the translations of 
the Holy Bible was as follows:- Greek (3rd century BC), Latin and Syriac and Coptic (3rd 
Century), Ethiopic, Gothic and Georgian (4th century), Armenian (5th century), Nubian (6th 
century), French (12th century) and English (14th century). Similarly, there is a legend 
which states that Kadija, Prophet Mohammed’s first wife, was an Ethiopian. Furthermore, 
when the early adopters of the Islamic faith faced prosecutions in their native Arabia, they 
were advised to go to Ethiopia by the Prophet himself. Hence, the histories of the two 
great religions are interwoven with indigenous culture and identity. Most Western 
scholars do not observe this.    
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above cultural characteristics are uniquely Amara is a profound error. They are 
reflected in many human cultures and identities.  
 
These complex systems and values define the relationships between the 
individual and the group on one hand, and the individual, the group and the State 
on the other hand. Hence, the centralized post WW II Atse State was restored 
based on complex sets of domestic relationships between the traditional ruler 
and the ruled, regional power houses and the then international power 
equilibrium. Haile Selassie I returned from back to his throne after five years of 
difficult life in exile. Therefore, to synchronize the governance system of the 
post WW II Government of Haile Selassie as a continuation of the so called 
neftegna system (similar to the Barbarians’ invasion of Europe or Morris Dobb’s 
military feudal colonization method of State formation, see for example Addis 
Hiwot, 1975), is not only a polemical writing, but it is a crude form of 
reductionism; probably executed because of either inexperience in research or 
because of a mental colonization of disenchantment.     
 
Ceteris paribus the forgoing discussion, despite the absence of Athenian form of 
democracy and a discernable level of trias politica doctrine in the Emperor’s 
governance system, Haile Selassie’s period was nonetheless characterized by 
modernity and development.13 Bahru Zewde (2003) characterizes the 1950-1975 
period as an era where modern administration systems were implemented, and 
succinctly outlines three major reasons why Haile Sellasie’s modernization 
effort was interrupted for the third (Fascist occupation, the failed coup of 
Mengistu Neway and the 1975 revolution) and final time.  They are Haile 
Selassie’s failure to make a sound land reform (because of the strength of the 
nobility), failure to enhance the power of the parliament [and monitoring 
institutions] and finally the failure to adumbrate the traditional polity in line with 
Scandinavian styled constitutional monarchy.  
 
Mesfin Wolde Mariam (2003) concurs with Bahru Zewde’s (op cit) observations 
and states that in spite of the progress that was made in modern education and 
the building of institutions, Emperor Haile Sellasie’s regime was not able to use 
the gains from education. Mesfin (op cit) argues that Haile Selassie failed to 
decentralize power (trias politica) and institute a land reform programme 
(economic relations). Hence, both Bahru and Mesfin agree about a positive 
correlation between constitutionality and economic liberalization (land reform). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
13  There is a widely held view which suggests that there is a link between democracy 
(elected government) and economic development. Anecdotal evidence however does not 
show this. Notwithstanding this, the converse is also not true. One cannot opt for 
dictatorship (including a vanguard party rule) and command economy simply because 
there is no direct link between democracy and development.  
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Shiferaw Bekele (2003), a discussant of Bahru’s (op cit) work succinctly 
summarized the first post Haile Selassie period (1975-1991). In his critique, 
Shiferaw showed the link between constitutionality and legitimacy. To this 
effect, Shiferaw (op cit) raised a penetrating question of whether Ethiopia can 
have a legitimate (in other words a genuine constitutional) government in the 
next 25 years. With regard to the 1975 revolution, he detoured from the review 
work and documented: (i) the link between economic development and 
revolution and (ii) the leadership vacuum that was left after the deposition of 
Emperor Haile Selassie. The translation from the Amarigna original (Shiferaw 
Bekele, 2003:24 paragraph 1; Revolution, Legitimacy and Politics: Three Major 
Processes, Vision 2020, Proceedings of the Ethiopian Economists Association, 
editor, Befekadu Degefe)) suggests the following: 
 
  “…The pre 1975 revolution was caused by the militancy of the intelligentsia 
whose vision was to bring revolution and tackle the challenges of 
underdevelopment through revolutionary programmes. Hence, the 
intelligentsia’s effort was to follow radical revolutionary ideology, and as a 
result (inadvertently) presented the country as a gift to extremists. Hence, for 
the 1975 revolution the main agent was the student movement. After the 
breakout of the revolution, to the dismay of the (naive) intelligentsia, the 
change had to take a different route. What was expected did not happen. 
Instead, the country was plunged into widespread bloodshed. The nation was 
filled with tears, torments and cry for help.”  
 
One clear thread that comes out of Shiferaw’s (op cit) observation is neither the 
intelligentsia nor the leaders of the coup did properly understand (i) the issues of 
underdevelopment, (ii) the way the Atse State was restored after the Fascist 
occupation of Ethiopia and (iii) the delicate case of Eritrea. It is important to 
note that both the opposition and the military advocated for a mono party 
political structure, classical Marxian economic policy and with regard to Eritrea 
almost all of them supported the “self determination” argument. In contrast to 
this, there was no significant support for the reform of the traditional polity, 
constitutionality and economic liberalization. If the military and its supporters 
had made a critical assessment of their initial disillusionments, the 1975 
revolution would have taken an altogether different route. Hence, one cannot 
totally blame the military for the mishaps in the Horn of Africa in mid and late 
1970s.  Furthermore, the entrenched collectivist culture tolerated/accepted the 
policy of nationalizations (of land and key economic institutions), while the 
power distance aspect of the culture condoned the rule of a vanguard party 
(Derge, which later became the Workers Party of Ethiopia). Hence, Marxism 
exploited Ethiopians’ key cultural dimensions of collectivism and power 
distance. 
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Notwithstanding this, in historical terms the vanguard party’s rule of Ethiopia 
was brief. It lasted seventeen years. In May 1991, after the end of the cold war, 
the balance of power in the Horn of Africa changed in favor of ethnic and 
secessionist movements which were operating in the Northern parts of the 
country. Accordingly, Asmara and Addis Ababa were captured by the joint 
guerrilla armies of the Tigrean People Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean 
People Liberation Front (EPLF). The collapse of the military regime was 
dramatic. This drama not only resulted in the change of key state organs 
(security and defense) and the abolishing of the Atse State, but the installation of 
the TPLF in Addis Ababa brought a diplomatic breakthrough for EPLF. Eritrea 
not only found an ardent advocate of “self determination” in Addis Ababa, but 
was assured that its separation will be completed without a glitch.    
 
TPLF’s problems however were not limited to securing its tenure (legitimacy) in 
a rather hostile hinterland and rehabilitating war torn Tigrai (the home of the 
guerrilla army), but devising a strategy for the administration of the rest of the 
Atse State was its major preoccupation. The same issues that sparked the 1975 
revolution were awaiting, this time with much greater scale. An ideology had to 
be created for the hastily organized EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary 
Democratic Front, with TPLF as its core). A Transitional Charter was devised 
apparently with the help of the EPLF. A variety of local and foreign scholars 
came to the front, evidently to provide “advice” and intellectual legitimacy for 
the political events in Ethiopia. Polemical writers and ‘neftegna’ theorists 
dominated the official public intellectual life. From the foreign scholars, British 
and American scholars (example Greenfield, Baxter, Henze and the likes) 
openly corroborated the singular ideology of cultural determinism (ethnic 
nationalism).  
 
In terms of governance, the problems of accountability in the Atse States (both 
Eritrea and Ethiopia) became more acute than the imperial era. In Eritrea the 
source of agency was supposed to be the citizens of the newly independent 
(democratic) country. In Ethiopia, the agency issue is raised only within the 
framework of an ethnic box, called ‘kilil’. Ethiopia was re-invented as a 
“federation” of ethnic groups. Hence, for the “federation” to be sustained TPLF 
had to find allies and opportunistic agents from other ethnic groups. For this, 
Marxism was juxtapositioned with ethnology, culture based politics and human 
rights conventions (example: Article 20 of the African [Banjul] Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on June 27 1981).  Hence, the 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to this day 
remains, in theory, a loose association of “independent” political groups. When 
this organizational arrangement is read together with the logic of power, it is 
evident that the tensions and contradictions within the ruling coalition and the 
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multicultural state institutions cannot be indefinitely hidden from the public 
domain.14  
 
It is in the middle of these legacies and political trends in Ethiopia and the 
Greater Horn of Africa that the Organization of African Unity was transformed 
into the African Union. The birth of the African Union brought new charters, 
governance paradigms, programmes and institutions. It has opened new sets of 
Pandora boxes in the Horn of Africa. Hence, it is suffice to say that the APRM 
has brought more challenges not only to the TPLF/EPRDF and its opponents, 
but to the entire Horn of Africa region. The appointment of Prime Minister 
Meles to lead NEPAD and APRM, instead of other leaders with better 
democratic credentials, has brought shocks and surprises on one hand and, 
indifference on the other hand (mainly super power and the donor community). 
Only time will tell whether this is a blessing or a curse for Ethiopia, and indeed 
for the continent as a whole.    
 
IV Traditional Leadership, APRM and Constitutionalism 
The debates of the 1960s amongst African scholars centered around 
decolonization and the merits of either of the two extreme ideologies of 
governance: capitalism and socialism. There were different definitions of 
democracy: the democracy of the masses versus the democracy of the 
capitalist.15 In both arguments there was a certain degree of utopianism in that 
the ideal capitalist or socialist state was viewed as an imaginary end, in a 
continuum, with a clear ‘destiny’; it is similar to the religious analogy of hell 
and heaven. Ethnic nationalists use the same line of argument.  
 
Furthermore, to overcome the development challenges of the continent, African 
scholars attempted to learn from the experience of Europe. Hence, by and large 
modernity was taken to be synonymous to Westernization (Bahru Zewde 
2003:1), and change meant revolution rather than the reform of traditional 
polity. Some attempted to explain the development gap between Africa and 
other parts of the world by “democracy” and culture. The African culture and 
the “African psyche” were deemed to be inferior (hence a need for cultural 
change and Westernization). The APRM purports to be a vehicle to reverse this 
trend, reinvigorate the pan African ideals of the 1960s (African Renaissance) 
and gradually introduce “good” governance in the continent.      
 
The ramifications of APRM to Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa are several. 
First, from a political theory perspective, the APRM is an anti thesis to 
segregationist ideologies, and probably a prologue to a single constitution not 
                                                          
14  The number and variety of defections, fallouts and purges are difficult to account for.    
15  For more on this and the problems of capitalism, see Rajan and Zingales (2002). The 
literature on social choice and social justice are also relevant.  
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just for the Horn of Africa but for the entire continent. This is true. 
Notwithstanding the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the APRM 
challenges singular identities that attempt to classify population groups in the 
“us” versus “them” framework, and exposes the accountability (agency) 
problem. More importantly, it shows that creating a mono ethnic State (uni-
cultural state) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for “good” 
governance.  In other words, the search for a “good” governed country 
(including Plato’s ideal republic) is not concomitant with segregationist world 
views and singular identity dimensions. If this is the case, it is the sets of 
constitutional instruments that range from doctrinal issues (trias politica) to the 
structure of government that create the “good” governed State than the 
singularity of the identity of its inhabitants (see Figure 1B). Furthermore, if for 
one reason or another singular identity inhabited independent states have to be 
created (as in Afar-ia, Amara-ia, Oromo-ia, Ogden-ia, Sidama-ia, Tigrai-ia, 
etc.), then the conditions for “good” governance in the new mono ethnic 
republics (ia-republics) must be prepared well in advance before separatist 
clauses (example Article 39 of Ethiopia’s constitution) or any other international 
convention is invoked. In other words secession alone is not a panacea for bad 
governance.16  
    
With regard to traditional leadership, how this institution was able to co-habit 
with the institutions of the modern State in Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Uganda and other African States requires closer examinations. Taking stock of 
traditional leadership polities in the Horn of Africa is important. In what ways 
the collectivist, power distanced, faith dominated, perseverance and thrift 
cultural dimensions of the inhabitants of the region are common and fit into the 
APRM doctrine is a question that scholars of substance and politicians need to 
investigate.  
 
The remaining parts of this section compare the constitutions of South Africa 
and Ethiopia and draw some conclusions as regards traditional leadership. 
During the last 30 years Ethiopia had three radically different constitutions 
while South Africa had two. Even though the two countries have had different 
paths of reaching their present constitutions, and their institutional realities are 
different, it is important to note that they were written at about the same time. 
Both were written after the end of the cold war. Ethiopia’s present constitution 
was authored by the victor, the TPLF/EPRDF, in 1993. South Africa’s 
constitution was written in 1996. It was drafted during a stable transition period, 
further negotiation with the moderate wing of the National Party (the party that 
created and administered the apartheid policy), lessons from India’s experience 
in constitutionalism and “social justice”.   
                                                          
16  This has already been observed in the Horn of Africa. The experience of Eritrea provides 
a lesson.    
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The South African constitution is built on the trias politica doctrine. It sets term 
limits for the president, provides for individual and class (group) rights and 
creates several monitoring organizations that are commonly known as chapter 7 
institutions. In contrast, Ethiopia’s constitution aims to create a new “union” 
from a “federation” of ethnic (volk) entities. The relationship between the party, 
the judiciary, law makers and the executive branch of the Government is 
blurred. This allows the dominant party to undermine law enforcement agencies, 
the judiciary and other control institutions like the National Electoral Board of 
Ethiopia (NEBE) and the Auditor General. In other words the agency problem is 
acute.   
 
The ramifications of the ontological realities in Ethiopia for APRM, its global 
image and the study of accountability are straightforward. Many doubt that the 
ruling regime will be a change agent. Notwithstanding this, APRM reviews can 
also be seen as an opportunity for reform. If however the APRM review is to 
gain credibility in Ethiopia, it is important that due care should be followed in 
the selection of both the “eminent” persons and country review team. Finally, it 
is important to note that audit failure can only be prevented by ensuring the 
independence and the technical ability of the audit (review) team.      
 
With regard to traditional leadership, Section 12 of the 1996 constitution of 
South Africa explicitly recognizes this form of leadership and authority. It does 
not however suggest a European or Japanese form of dynasty for the country as 
a whole. It merely recognizes regional power houses, and limits traditional 
polity’s role to matters related to justice, customary law and conflict resolution. 
Section 212 (1) states that national and provincial legislation bodies are 
empowered to create laws. The Council of Traditional Leaders was established 
at a national level. It is interesting to note that the Council of Traditional 
Leaders is separate from the Senate, which later became the National Council of 
Provinces.  
 
Another important feature of the South African constitution is that public 
administration is separated from the Council of Traditional Leaders. Section 195 
(1) states that public administration must be governed by democratic values and 
principles enshrined in the Constitution, and provides for high standards of 
professional, efficient and effective use of resources, development oriented 
public administration, fairness and equity, accountability, transparency and 
representation. At this point it is important to note that the constitution carefully 
delimits the power of the traditional leader, hence the agency problem of 
governance, in the context of public governance (the ruled and the ruler) does 
not arise. The Constitution observes a separate form of relationship between the 
principals and the agent(s). On the down side, the constitution does not observe 
 19
 
traditional (indigenous) leadership as a skill, a scarce resource and does not state 
how it is going to be harnessed.17  
 
Ethiopia’s Constitution does not altogether recognize traditional (indigenous) 
leadership and polity. Hence, descendants of traditional leaders must tow the 
official line if they are to share privileges or lead normal life inside Ethiopia. 
Evidently this brings both opportunistic behavior and disentrancement, on the 
part of traditional leadership institutions and polity. It also allows the ruling 
regime to gain from conflict and competition among traditional polities, thus 
exacerbating the culture based politics and bigotry. A similar criticism can also 
be directed at the opposition. The role of traditional leadership institutions are 
not coherently articulated, including by those that promise to advance a neo-
liberal constitution.   
 
Notwithstanding this, the works of Befekadu Degefe (2003) and Hailu Shawel 
(2003) can easily be extended to include (i) the analysis of how the problems of 
trust are resolved in collectivist and power distanced cultures such as Ethiopia; 
(ii) how traditional (indigenous) leadership (central-regional-district-village 
level) finds space for itself and gets harnessed in a constitutional and democratic 
order; (iii) the role of traditional polities in conflict prevention and; (iv) the 
articulation of the relationship between identity and culture in the context of the 
trias politica doctrine and the APRM state requires a new discourse. This 
discourse must start early so that the next election is not “postponed”, boycotted 
or face the same challenge as the failed election of May 15, 2005.  In other 
words, Ethiopians, including TPLF/EPRDF need to take the opportunity to join 
the movement for a Pan African Constitution and governance system. This way 
it can avoid poor draftsmanship of laws, the dominance of segregationist 
ideologies, conflict, the exclusion of minorities from mainstream life, and 
evidently improve the standards of public governance. 
 
V Concluding Remarks and Direction for Future Research 
This paper has attempted to use agency theory to understand issues of “good” 
governance and accountability. Its contributions are fourfold. First, using the 
microeconomic theory of agency and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the paper 
identified that democracy and accountability are not unique concepts in Africa. 
Second, the discussion on APRM and agency led to one important insight. That 
is, the existence of a mono ethnic state is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for “good” governance. Third, the paper documented that traditional 
(indigenous) leadership polity has a better chance of contributing to a “good” a 
governance system if the constitution is structured in the trias politica doctrine 
                                                          
17  This observation however is changing. The series of statements made by the State 
President suggests that the tax payer must bear the costs of maintaining and harnessing 
traditional leadership.  
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than under ethno nationalism or other forms of segregationist ideologies. Fourth, 
with regard to Ethiopia, the APRM brings both opportunities and challenges, if 
the APRM review process is credible. The current deadlock in Ethiopian politics 
might be resolved if examined from the vantage points of the APRM. 
 
Ethiopia’s ethnic “federations” might be easier to be linked to one another, and 
the cultural walls that have been built can probably be demolished by 
consideration of a continental level governance doctrine, commonality of 
cultures and recognition of diversity. The above discussions point to one 
direction. Traditional polity and indigenous leadership are not devoid of 
modernity as the English thesaurus is suggesting. They have the potential to 
move with times. Blending new ideologies with traditional (indigenous) 
leadership system has been the main challenge for African scholars. Imitating 
foreign ideologies, without the consideration of ontological realities is a crude 
form of replication. It worsens the problems of accountability. Future research 
needs to address how accountability is resolved in collectivist societies and link 
the outcome of the research to a Pan African constitution.  
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